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Abstract 
This paper compares the standard economic welfare approach to poverty measurement to the 
empirical approaches proposed in the capability literature under the special focus of their 
suitability for operational poverty assessment, i.e. targeting and outreach evaluation. We 
question whether the measurement of per capita daily expenditures compared with a monetary 
poverty line justifiably remains the most widely used approach regarding poverty assessment. 
Its underlying value judgments and unsatisfactory assumptions differ considerably from those 
of the capability concept of poverty but the two approaches can be linked and critically 
compared with respect to the role of income, the conceptualisation of absolute poverty and the 
development of operational tools. We argue that despite the progress made in operationalizing 
the capability approach, there remain serious challenges when focussing on targeting and 
outreach evaluation and propose three alternative solutions for dealing with this capability 
dilemma in practice. 
 
   2
Introduction 
The old concern among donors, governments and practitioners about their success in reaching 
the poor has been re-enforced by the time-related urgency for effective action in order to 
reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. And it has in some cases entered national 
legislation as, for example, in the Microenterprise for Self-Reliance Act passed by the US 
Congress in 2000 and amended in 2003, which requires that all microfinance institutions that 
receive funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development report the share of 
resources allocated to the ‘very poor’ and the absolute number of ‘very poor’ among their 
clients. These commitments call for operational poverty assessment tools, which are both 
time- and cost-saving and appropriate in terms of the chosen definition of poverty. Poverty 
assessment here refers to all empirical measurement efforts at the project or program level 
that try to identify and describe the poor in the context of ex-ante targeting and ex-post 
outreach evaluations based on predictive rather than causal analysis. (This does not rule out, 
however, that some of the conclusions drawn might also apply to ex-post impact assessment 
over time.) 
 
The understanding and measurement approaches in this regard have considerably improved 
during the last decades. Economic theorists, development researchers and practitioners made 
remarkable progress in the development of concepts and tools to identify and characterize the 
poor and to measure the magnitude and extent of poverty. This development implies that at 
the latest since the capability concept of poverty (Alkire, 2002b; Nussbaum, 1995; Nussbaum, 
2000; Sen, 1985; Sen, 1987a; Sen, 1987b; Sen, 1992) and further contributions such as the 
human rights perspective (Townsend, 2005), we can no longer measure monetary income or 
expenditures and seriously claim that we are assessing well-being in a comprehensive way, if 
that is the goal. In view of the remaining challenges involved in transferring the often quite 
philosophical capability concepts to practical poverty assessment, however, money-metric 
approaches continue to play a vital role in political decision-making and evaluation. This is 
particularly the case in small and large-scale project and program evaluations that rely on 
operational tools for absolute poverty assessment to determine whether the poverty outreach 
targets are met.  
Are political decision-makers, practitioners and researchers always aware of the moral 
implications and economic consequences of the chosen definition of ‘(very) poor’? Can the 
continuing predominance of monetary deprivation measures still be justified by   3
operationalization problems in the context of targeting and evaluation efforts? Which and how 
severe are the remaining challenges of operationalizing multidimensional poverty concepts? 
 
As a complement to existing comparisons of the capability approach with classical monetary 
concepts (Kuklys, 2005; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2003), it is the aim of this review to critically 
discuss the present state of the two approaches with special focus on their contributions and 
implications for the operational assessment of absolute poverty. It makes explicit the implicit 
value judgments in poverty analysis using general rather than formal economic language.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
conceptually diverse approaches and shortcomings to poverty in the form of income 
deprivation in welfare economics. The third part summarizes the core principles and 
theoretical justification of the capability concept as introduced by Amartya Sen and the role of 
income therein, followed by the discussion of challenges and recent attempts to operationalize 
the capability approach in the forth section. We conclude by presenting different views on the 
possibility to reconcile both approaches and evaluate income versus capability measures with 
respect to their suitability for operational poverty assessment.  
Poverty as income deprivation in welfare economics  
Welfare economics as presented in economic textbooks represents the normative branch of 
economics that tries to give decision rules about what is good and bad for society by means of 
economic theorems (Feldman and Serrano, 2006; Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004). Based on 
the two fundamental theorems of the competitive markets mechanism and Pareto optimality, 
classical welfare economics is concerned with two basic economic phenomena, namely, the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources in a society (economic efficiency) and the effects on 
income distribution associated with it (Feldman and Serrano, 2006; Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 
2004; Lange, 1942). Its basic unit of measurement is the individual, which is assumed to 
rationally act according to own ‘preferences’ or ‘desires’ in order to maximize ‘utility’ subject 
to an exogenously given budget constraint. Utility, conventionally used synonymously with 
happiness or satisfaction, is assumed to best represent individual welfare levels (Just, Hueth, 
and Schmitz, 2004). The respective branch in welfare economics following this concept is 
called welfarism. The overall welfare of a society (social welfare) is achieved by some form 
of aggregation function. The respective formal representation of such value judgments in 
terms of a collective choice rules for ordering alternative social states in a society is referred 
to as social welfare functions (Sen, 1979a). It can, for example, describe social welfare as the   4
unweighted sum of individual utilities (called sum-ranking), a concept that refers to the 
classical  utilitarian approach to welfare economics as developed by Bentham, Mill, 
Edgeworth, Sidgwick, Marshall, and Pigou (Atkinson, 2001; Sen, 1996).  
In classical welfare economics, restrictive market assumptions are made (including the 
uniformity of prices faced by all consumers, the non-existence of externalities and public 
goods, and the marketability and constant availability of goods and services subject to 
individual preferences), some of which have successfully been relaxed in modern welfare 
models (Feldman and Serrano, 2006). At the individual level, too, strong assumptions are 
made concerning the preference-driven consumption behavior. They include utility 
maximization as the only basis for decision-making behavior, the independence of utility 
from non-chosen goods and services, the inexistence of an intrinsic value of choice, and the 
uniformity and cardinal comparability of preferences and needs across all individuals (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980; Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004; Sen, 1987a).  
Empirically, individual welfare is usually expressed in monetary income or expenditure terms 
as the valid basis of welfare judgments because under the above assumptions of equal 
preferences and prices faced across individuals, income constitutes a valid measure of the 
level of indirect utility. Conceptually, it makes no difference “whether the budget set is 
interpreted as an ex ante opportunity set [in terms of income] or an ex post measure of utility 
derived from the chosen goods [in the form of expenditures]“ (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005: 
18) because the act of choosing itself and the range of available options to choose from have 
no intrinsic value and do not change the utility level achieved from the finally chosen bundle 
of goods. Under this scenario, all welfare-relevant goods and services can be acquired by 
purchase in competitive markets so that utility increases with the amount of goods consumed 
and different levels of utility can only be achieved by different income (or expenditures) 
levels (Klasen, 2000). Hence, they constitute an essential input to all classical poverty and 
development analysis.  
Applied welfare economics directly uses social welfare functions for policy design and 
evaluation regarding the overall changes in the whole income distribution without attaching 
special weights to certain parts of the distribution. In contrast, poverty and inequality analysis 
employ a poverty line Z and focus nearly exclusively on the amount and distribution of 
income Y of the population part below this line thus attaching zero weight to the income 
changes of the non-poor Deaton, 1997. In social welfare terms, this would equal a functional 
form of  ) , ( Z Y p  with  0 ) , ( = Z Y p  for  Z Y ≥  Atkinson, 1987. Poverty analysis relies on the 
selection of a summary measure or poverty index (such as the poverty indices by Foster,   5
Greer, and Thorbecke (1984)) and a decision on the relationship of poverty and inequality in 
the analysis. Given that these summary measures of poverty often neglect the implicit strong 
restrictions of the underlying social welfare function, Atkinson early proposed to directly use 
social welfare functions to express inequality and poverty in order to make the respective 
assumptions explicit and be able to adjust them to the understanding of poverty in the 
respective context (Atkinson, 1970; Atkinson, 1987). A simple poverty headcount H would 




) ( . “In this regard, poverty measures are special cases of 
social welfare measures“ (Deaton, 1997: 141), although in practice, they often break free from 
this origin. This is the case when poverty analysis neglects that in reality, no such 
discontinuity in the welfare distribution exists as the strict cut-off in terms of a poverty line 
suggests. In most situations, “poverty is not really a discrete condition. One does not 
immediately acquire or shed the afflictions we associate with the notion of poverty by 
crossing any particular income line,” as expressed by Watts (1977: 28-29). In this early paper, 
he effectively suggests a (continuous) poverty function that can be embedded in the 
framework of an overall utility function of society whose one part then refers to disutility due 
to poverty (cf. Kakwani and Son, forthcoming 2007).
1 
Apart from the choice and careful use of a poverty index or function, it is the construction of 
the poverty line that directly reflects the underlying definition of poverty. In the poverty 
literature, the line generally expresses the amount of income – or expenditures – that 
represents some sort of ‘minimum standard of living’ in a given context. As for social 
welfare, the most common indicators of poverty are income and consumption expenditures. 
The advantages of expenditures over income have been intensively discussed in the literature 
and can only briefly be mentioned at this point. They refer to the fact that expenditures are 
more stable an indicator of long-term command over resources and thus of welfare given that 
it reveals information on income in the past and future as well because households smooth 
varying income over time. It also circumvents the difficulties related to home-produced and 
other non-market goods that formally do not produce income (Deaton, 1997; Ravallion, 
1992). Apart from the decision on income or expenditures, several methods for the adjustment 
of price differences and the improvement of interpersonal comparability allow for poverty 
comparisons across space and over time, one of the main purposes of poverty analysis.
2  
Different historical methods for the construction of poverty lines – be it a political decision 
regarding the eligibility for state benefits, an average perception of minimum income by 
‘representative’ citizens, an ‘objective’ definition by experts respecting the fulfillment of   6
some ‘basic needs’, or the ‘subjective’ perception of subsistence income by the poor 
themselves (Goedhart et al., 1977) – have the following concept in common. Economic 
poverty is defined as situational circumstances (as opposed to individuals characteristics) in 
which the consumption set in terms of the command over basic resources is severely 
restricted: 
 
“In simpler language, we may say that welfare is defined in terms of command over real goods and services-
command over resources, for short. The less command one has over resources, the less welfare one enjoys; that 
is, the poorer one is. Poverty is then defined as a situation where command over resources falls below a certain 
level, the poverty line ” (Goedhart et al., 1977: 504). 
 
Regarding the historical methods mentioned above, doubtlessly, social safety net programs 
and other state benefits for the poor have their own eligibility criteria (that might deviate from 
a mere income poverty line), and participatory and ‘subjective’ approaches to poverty 
assessment have indeed become sophisticated in the last decades and are widely used either as 
welfare indicators themselves, for example, in the form of Participatory Wealth Ranking 
(Gibbons, Simanowitz, and Nkuna, 1999), or as recently, to complement and validate 
‘objective’ measures (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2006). In the mere construction of poverty 
lines, however, it is the ‘objective’ approaches that have become the fundamental grounds for 
defining minimum income levels worldwide.  
One approach refers to the ‘Food-Energy Intake’ method that determines the income or 
expenditure level necessary to meet pre-determined food-energy requirement for a male or 
female individual at a given age and activity level. Usually, this underlying energy 
requirement does not do justice to every individual but is based on average standard 
recommendations by the World Health Organization (Ravallion, 1998). The common methods 
to relate nutritional intake to total consumption expenditure rely on econometric regression 
analysis based on an expected value of caloric intake. Thus, the ‘Food-Energy Intake’ method 
tries to find a monetary poverty line, below which nutritional basic needs are supposed to be 
unmet and which is expressed in terms of overall (food and non-food) consumption 
expenditures. Problems with these nutrition-based poverty lines arise in the case of 
differences in tastes, activity levels, relative prices, and in the provision of public goods 
across regions and over time because these may result in shifts in the relationship between 
food intake and consumption that are irrelevant for changes in economic welfare terms, i.e., 
command over basic resources (for details refer to Ravallion, 1998; Tarp et al., 2002).  
   7
The other approach is known as the ‘Cost of Basic Needs’ method first introduced by 
Rowntree (1901). It determines the cost of an appropriate bundle of goods to assure the 
fulfillment of ‘basic’ food and non-food consumption needs and is the most widely used 
method in less developed countries. (Note that in this context, ‘basic needs’ are meant as 
input  factors to the calculation of a subsistence income or expenditures, which is 
fundamentally different from the understanding of the ‘Basic Needs Approach’ to poverty 
discussed below.) Under certain assumptions, the ‘Cost of Basic Needs’ ideally represents a 
utility-consistent cost-of-living index, although in practice, the bundle of goods rather exhibits 
a normative minimum income that is, however, related to existing consumption choices as 
closely as possible (Ravallion, 1998).
3 The food component is based on stipulated nutrition 
requirements converted to a culturally or regionally representative bundle of food goods, 
(which includes to a lower extent some of the problems faced with the ‘Food-Energy Intake’ 
method). The determination of the non-food component, however, is more complicated and 
alternative methods are discussed in detail by Ravallion (1998). Accordingly, a basic-needs 
poverty line including a modest set of non-food goods can be estimated applying a food-share 
Engel curve. Differences in poverty analysis over time and space depending on the use of the 
‘Food-Energy Intake’ versus the ‘Cost of Basic Needs’ method have been analyzed, for 
example, by Tarp et al. (2002). They conclude that the latter is the recommendable alternative 
in terms of robustness of poverty profiles. Already before, Glewwe and van der Gaag (1990) 
showed that different definitions even within the context of money-metric poverty lead to 
different groups identified as poor and that definitions should be chosen carefully and 
according to the purpose of the analysis. 
 
In the late 1970s, pioneers like Paul Streeten, concerned with the limitations of growth-related 
development strategies, started to counter the common GNP approach to poverty 
measurement with an alternative, the ‘Basic Needs Approach’ (Hicks and Streeten, 1979; 
Hicks, 1979; Streeten, 1977; Streeten, 1981; Streeten and Burki, 1978). In the context of its 
appearance, the Basic Needs Approach was meant as a means to track progress in 
development at the national level in terms of cross-country comparisons and policy guidance: 
“This new focus on meeting basic human needs requires an indicator or a set of indicators, 
therefore, by which deprivation can be judged and measured, and policies directed at its 
alleviation and eradication can be initiated and monitored” (Hicks and Streeten, 1979: 568). 
In this paper that has received much attention until today, the authors propose to separately 
consider output indicators of basic needs directly with respect to health, education, food,   8
water supply, sanitation, and housing or to use even a single health indicator as an alternative 
to (nutrition-based) income poverty lines that use these factors at most as inputs to calculate 
an adequate minimum income as described above. The usual criticism of the Basic Needs 
Approach is summarized by Glewwe and van der Gaag (1990: 805): “There is usually no 
attempt to aggregate these various aspects of basic needs into a single welfare indicator, 
which complicates the classification of households as poor and nonpoor. […] A second 
problem with this approach is the subjectivity involved in determining adequate levels of 
health care, housing, education, cultural amenities, and so on.” A part from the debate on its 
operationalization and aggregation – a criticism that is has in common with the capability 
approach – the Basic Needs Approach is rather to be seen as a multidimensional alternative to 
an income-based poverty concept and can as such be considered as an early precursor of the 
capability approach. Sen points out that already the early welfare economist Pigou presented a 
list of basic needs in 1952 (Sen, 1987b), and until today, a deep moral and methodological 
discomfort with a mere income approach motivates lead economists to propose at least a 
combination of the latter with the needs theory:  
 
“Those of us who have been exposed to field experience have been impressed by the prominence of health 
concerns in what people tell you about their poverty. Income, housing, and jobs tend to predominate when health 
is normal, but if someone gets sick, is hit by a car, or has a friend or relative who has been raped or murdered, 
income poverty recedes into the background in people’s perceptions. Many millions of people around the world 
will die from AIDS, with untold misery and deprivation. […] My view is that the World Bank should back away 
from its current too-concentrated focus on income headcount numbers. It should emphasize a much wider range 
of other measures, focusing on deprivations that may be more important than deprivation of income” (Deaton, 
2001: 145). 
 
Although the basic needs concept has been criticized by the founders of the capability 
approach themselves for being too narrowly linked to commodity possession, (which is 
considered only instrumentally relevant (Alkire, 2002b; Sen, 1987b)), there are recent 
advocates who prefer Streeten’s needs theory even to the capability approach (Reader, 2006). 
The next section introduces Sen’s famous concept of poverty as capability deprivation in 
order to contrast it to the welfarist poverty definition before we draw some conclusions 
regarding recent reconciliation attempts between the two and the necessary caution when 
using monetary measures in practice.   9
Poverty as capability deprivation and the role of income  
In the previous section, we have seen that social welfare functions embody the common value 
judgments of social states in classical welfare economics. It is at this point of value judgments 
underlying our definitions and ranking of different states of well-being (and poverty) where 
Sen’s capability approach departs from established utility concepts. Amartya Sen identifies 
himself as social choice theorist (Sen, 1995: 18). In contrast to, or rather, complementary to 
welfare economics, which offers market-based decision rules about what might be ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ for society, social choice theory is concerned with social preferences themselves, i.e., 
how they might be found, how collective choice relates to individual preferences, and how to 
valuate different apparently ‘good’ solutions for society in diverse situations (Feldman and 
Serrano, 2006). In order to at least roughly explore Sen’s differences from utilitarian welfare 
economics, a basic introduction to the specific language and arguments of the capability 
approach is necessary to facilitate the understanding of Sen’s concepts. 
This sub-section is based on a tiny part of Sen’s extensive writing regarding his concept of 
poverty as capability deprivation, namely primarily the two Tanner lectures about ‘The 
Standard of Living’ (Sen, 1987a; Sen, 1987b) and his books entitled ‘Inequality Reexamined’ 
(Sen, 1992 and) ‘Development as Freedom’ (Sen, 2000), in addition to some further 
publications that are only shortly referred to.
4 It can, therefore, only give a very reduced 
picture of Sen’s rich work and serves the specific purpose of embedding the assessment of 
income or expenditures into the broader context of human well-being. The simplified 
illustration in Figure 1 may serve as an orientation. As its name suggests, the approach centers 
around ‘capabilities’ that refer to the ‘freedoms’ or ‘real opportunities’ people enjoy to 
promote or achieve the life they want to lead. Human capabilities include ‘basic’, i.e., 
universally valued ones (like longevity, fertility, or the capability to drink clean water) as well 
as ‘more complex’ ones (like the opportunity to learn calligraphy or to eat marzipan during 
the Advent season). According to Sen, the freedom to choose, which implies the availability 
of alternatives, has not only instrumental but also intrinsic value:  
 
“[...] the value of the living standard is given by the capability to lead various types of life, and while special 
importance is to be attached to the actual life style chose, the availability of other options has some value too” 
(Sen, 1987a: 36).  
   10
In this regard, participatory approaches to the assessment and reduction of poverty already 
imply one important aspect of enhancing ‘well-being’ itself just by giving a group (and the 
marginalized subgroups therein!) the opportunity to choose and decide themselves, regardless 
of the actual activities or outcomes. 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of some core aspects of the capability approach (Own 
illustration based on Sen’s approach as discussed in Alkire, 2002b; Sen, 1987a; Sen, 1987b; 
Sen, 2000) 
 
With respect to the instrumental character of ‘freedoms’, Sen differentiates between five main 
types of “instrumental freedoms that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the overall freedom 
people have to live the way they would like to live”, namely, political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (Sen, 2000: 
38), most of which have to be provided at the aggregate level of a whole society in terms of 
political action and public support. These freedoms (that appear in the form of instrumental 
rights, opportunities and entitlements) endow people with multiple ‘capabilities’ or 
‘freedoms’ at the individual level and give them the ability to achieve the living conditions, 
that is, the activities and states of being that they value. In Sen’s language, these ‘valuable 
Human capabilities
- e.g. longevity, fertility, opportunity to drink 
clean water, to have a fulfilling occupation, to 
enjoy nature, to breath clean air
= freedom to choose between alternative ways
of living one‘s life
- basic and complex capabilities
Freedoms
= instrumental rights, opportunities, entitlements…
- intrinsically and instrumentally important
- political freedoms
- economic facilities 
- social opportunities 
- transparency guarantees 
- protective security
Functionings
- e.g. being well-nourished, being 
educated, having a fulfilling occupation, 
having the desired number of children
= living conditions that are valued
= valuable ‚beings and doings‘ (activities 
and states of beings)
- instrumentally important
Implications for operationalization:
• Aggregate measure of well-being/ poverty?

















being and doings’ are referred to as ‘functionings’ and represent the achieved way of life in 
all its facets that an individual has chosen and realized out of a wide range of possible options. 
Examples of functionings are: being well-nourished, having a fulfilling occupation, being 
adequately sheltered, being educated, having self respect and respect of others, living 
according to the traditions of a certain religion, or having the number of children one wanted 
to have. Accordingly, poverty is defined in terms of capability deprivation and results in the 
non-achievement of the actually valued functionings of a person (Sen, 2000). This view 
strongly departs from the widely used poverty definition related to income and/or asset 
ownership in utilitarian welfare economics.
5 
 
Coming back to Sen’s fundamental critique of the traditional economic approach to poverty, 
he precisely questions that “any evaluative concept in economics [including the standard of 
living] must be ultimately based on some notion or other of utility” and instead claims that 
also “[…] non-utility features may have intrinsic and direct relevance” (Sen, 1987a: 5). This 
implies a critique of the omission of non-market goods and services in the utilitarian welfare 
concept (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005), but Sen goes even further by raising the definition to a 
higher conceptual level beyond the access to resources, as we will see below.  
He furthermore argues that utility, whether defined as pleasure and happiness, desire 
fulfillment or choice, cannot seriously claim to be exclusively relevant, and that happiness or 
choice, although legitimately valuable in this context, are not sufficient a basis to value the 
standard of living of a person.
6  
The same would apply to approaches that relate well-being directly to commodity possession. 
As outlined in the previous section, one widely accepted concept in this regard is the ‘Basic 
Needs Approach’ that usually works with a commodity-based concept in the form of a certain 
basket of goods that is assumed to allow the fulfillment of ‘basic human needs’ in a specific 
country or region. According to Sen, the possession of basic commodities itself – just like 
utility achievement – is not at all unrelated to well-being but its claim to represent the 
universal minimum level of well-being itself, rather than being one component of it, is 
questioned: 
 
“[...] the strategic relevance of basic needs is not a controversial matter. What is open to debate and disputation is 
the foundation of this concern. Are basic needs important because and only because their fulfillment contributes 
to utility?” (Sen, 1987b: 25).  
   12
In this line of argumentation, the definition of the standard of living as ‘being well off’ in 
commodity terms, although most often related to ‘well-being’, reduces the actual matter of 
life to the resources a person has as a means to another end, namely, to lead a life that is of 
high value to an individual person (Sen, 1987a). When transferred to the opposite case of 
defining poverty, the analog argument says: 
 
“In this perspective, poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness 
of incomes, which is the standard criterion of identification of poverty. The perspective of capability-poverty 
does not involve any denial of the sensible view that low income is clearly one of the major causes of poverty, 
since lack of income can be a principal reason for a person’s capability deprivation. Indeed, inadequate income is 
a strong  predisposing condition for an impoverished life” (Sen, 2000: 87, accentuations added here). 
 
This point is central to the discussion of monetary poverty assessment as presented in this 
study as it includes some important implications for the self-concept of such an exercise: 
Firstly, in the above citation, it is recognized that income deprivation (whether measured 
directly or through expenditures) is an important cause of poverty. As an important means to 
well-being, income can thus be a valuable and important part of evaluating living standards.  
Secondly, however, it represents only one of several dimensions that matter, and as such, 
income as well as the fulfillment of ‘basic needs’ can only be instrumentally significant (Sen, 
1987b; Sen, 2000) and represent an “intermediate stage of the analysis” (Sen, 1987b: 26).
7 It 
follows that income deprivation should not be equated with a comprehensive poverty 
definition itself unless a monetary poverty line is set in a way that it represents the costs of 
achieving basic human functionings. According to Kakwani, “[h]owever, that is not the case 
with the most frequently used international poverty measure, the PPP $1/day per person. It 
was constructed by World Bank researchers in 1990 as the median of the lowest ten national 
poverty lines available in a sample of 33 countries” (Kakwani, 2006a: 21), and not according 
to any ethical consideration of well-being or basic needs (Edward, 2006).  
 
Suppose that we rather deal with a more meaningful ‘cost of basic needs’ poverty line, as 
described in the previous section. At first view, the resource-type measure of income seems 
conceptually quite similar to the idea of a capability set because it contains alternative bundles 
of goods and services that could potentially be bought. This view is expressed by Greer and 
Thorbecke (1986: 60-61) who state that “Sen [himself] has provided an important argument in 
favor of a monetary poverty line: it allows the individual the freedom to choose how or even 
whether to satisfy his or her basic needs. Individuals who have the ability to meet the   13
minimum needs should not be considered poor even if they do not do so.” In difference to the 
income constraint, however, the capability constraint refers to both marketable and non-
market goods (including externalities and public goods) and considers the interpersonal 
heterogeneity in converting a resource into an achieved output (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). 
 
This latter aspect is based on the observation that even if price adjustments and differences in 
purchasing power are considered, a certain income level can produce very different standards 
of living according to the availability of (public) goods and services and the requirements for 
leading the desired life under the environmental, economic, political, social, and cultural 
conditions across regions (Blackwood and Lynch, 1994). The same difference in conversion 
factors applies to the individual level (cf. Figure 1): 
 
“Despite the crucial role of incomes in the advantages enjoyed by different persons, the relationship between 
income (and other resources), on the one hand, and individual achievements and freedoms, on the other, is 
neither constant nor in any sense automatic and irresistible. Different types of contingencies lead to systematic 
variations in the ‘conversion’ of income into the distinct ‘functionings’ we can achieve, and that affects the life 
style we can enjoy” (Sen, 2000: 109). 
 
Thus the same level of input in the form of monetary income can mean very different outputs 
in terms of standard of living given the size, age, sex, gender role, health and physiological 
conditions of a person (Sen, 1996), which is what we could simply name the difference in 
needs. Seen this way, it is by no means ‘odd’, as suggested by Kakwani (2006), to call a 
millionaire with an incurable disease as – at least partly – capability poor. The millionaire 
would definitely be less capability deprived than a low-income person with the same 
incurable disease but being a millionaire does not make this person non-poor in the capability 
space. (This observation is irrespective of whether the disease can be alleviated by public 
action like health services.)  
Two aspects are important here. In the first place, whether and how the conversions of 
available income into valued (and not just available!) functionings take place, is impossible to 
evaluate at the stage of income measurement, even when measured in terms of expenditures 
for marketable goods. This objection aims at the convention in utilitarian welfare economics, 
according to which the observed market choice is interpreted as a direct expression of 
individual utility, an aspect of utility theory that Sen criticizes as the confounding of 
(observable) choosing with (unobservable) benefiting (Sen, 1987a).    14
Secondly, the above argument indirectly leads us to a further major constraint of the monetary 
income approach as it is currently employed in the form of household surveys, namely, its 
inability to capture the actual income poverty at the individual level. The individual’s actual 
command over resources remains disguised in the averaging exercise of dividing overall 
income of the household by its members, (which even applies when equivalent scales are 
employed, although to a lower extent (Deaton, 1997)).  
This ‘interpersonal heterogeneity in converting income into welfare’ is neglected in welfare 
economics (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005: 9). Consistent with this line of argumentation, Sen 
formulates the following, remarkably challenging demands on policy-makers: 
 
“The respective roles of personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, 
differences in relational perspectives and distributions within the family have to receive the serious attention they 
deserve for the making of public policy” (Sen, 2000: 109). 
 
Having said so, he consequently recognizes that “there is, of course, a long way to go” (Sen, 
1987b: 38) in terms of re-thinking the traditional ways of understanding and measuring 
poverty as well as of operationalizing the capability approach. The latter aspect obviously is 
an important pre-condition for all applied development economics and poverty analysis. In 
the following, we will clarify if Sen wanted his concept to be operationalized at all and 
present some recent attempts to empirically measure capability deprivation. 
Capability measurement as an operationally feasible alternative? 
Apart from mentioned theoretical debates concerning Sen’s critique of utilitarian 
assumptions, skeptics of the capability approach have often complained about its openness 
and abstractness that would seriously complicate its operationalization. Sen himself defends 
this openness as being essential for a market-independent formation of social preferences and 
valuation of alternative development objectives and strategies: “In the case of functionings 
and capabilities, since there are no markets directly involved, the weighting exercise has to be 
done in terms of explicit valuations, drawing on the prevailing values in a given society […]. 
This explicitness is not, in itself, a bad thing, since it gives the public a clear opportunity to 
question the values and to debate the decisions” (Sen, 1996: 58). And he explicitly argues that 
“[…] the approach must nevertheless be practical in the sense of being usable for actual 
assessments of the living standard” (Sen, 1987b: 20), which, however, “[…] does not, of 
course, imply that all the refinements are easy to incorporate in empirical studies” (Sen,   15
1987b: 38). He never made such an attempt himself and argued against the specification of a 
general blueprint list of basic capabilities or functionings needed for practical implementation. 
 
Several efforts to empirically apply the capability concept have been undertaken in the 
context of comparing, combining or contrasting the capability approach with income poverty 
measures of standard welfare economics, and vice versa (c.f. Klasen, 2000; Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2003). A comprehensive example of such comparative, theoretically sound research 
is the work by Kuklys and Robeyns (2005). They show that recent approaches in non-
welfarist research allow to relax some of the strict assumptions of utilitarian welfarism at least 
in macroeconomic welfare analyses. Behavioral assumptions such as the equality of utility 
functions across individuals have been considered by the employment of equivalence scales 
that account at least for some of the exogenously given heterogeneity in conversion factors or 
needs. Regarding the market assumptions in microeconomic poverty analysis, however, this 
would imply the use of an extremely extended indirect utility function including shadow 
prices for public and non-market goods and externalities at the individual level, the estimation 
of the individual value of choice and the consideration of individual conversion factors or 
needs (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). Needless to say that the related feasibility constraints in 
terms of measurability, data collection and econometric challenges make the use of an input-
type variable like income in the spirit of the capability approach more than difficult. The only 
alternatives are to accept the welfaristic assumptions attached to the money metric or use 
direct measures of output of welfare. 
 
Recent examples of such output-oriented approaches in terms of empirical applications of the 
capability approach can be roughly divided into at least three branches according to the data 
source used: i) one that conducts welfare analysis in terms of policy evaluation using 
aggregated data and national statistics at the macroeconomic level (c.f. UNDP, 1996; UNDP, 
1997), ii) another that performs either social welfare analysis, poverty and inequality analysis, 
or targeting and outreach evaluations, as emphasized here, all of which determine a certain 
poverty cut-off and use microeconomic data from household surveys to measure welfare at 
the individual or household level (c.f. Klasen, 2000; Kuklys, 2005; Qizilbash and Clark, 
2005), iii) and a third one in the form of welfare or poverty analysis using primary 
(qualitative) field data and participatory techniques (c.f. Alkire, 2002b). 
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In order to translate Sen’s theoretical concept into operational methodologies, Robeyns 
(2006b) identifies three specifications that have to be made, namely, i) how to quantitatively 
or qualitatively select the relevant capabilities or functionings and their respective indicators, 
ii) whether and at which stage to aggregate the measures and which weights to use, and – 
most essentially – iii) whether to analyze functionings or capabilities. 
With respect to the first aspect, some general procedural selection criteria for theoretically 
generating a list of capabilities have been formulated by Robeyns (2003). A more concrete 
effort in this regard is contained in the book by Sabina Alkire entitled “Valuing Freedoms” 
(Alkire, 2002b: chapter 5 and 6). In the context of small-scale project evaluation, she 
addresses the questions of how to normatively and empirically identify relevant dimensions of 
well-being
8, and how to implement the generated list in participatory impact assessments. The 
proposed procedures have in common that they recommend to proceed in at least two stages 
to draw up such a list. One step represents the ideal theoretical case of all relevant 
functionings necessary for human well-being and the other derives a pragmatic list based on 
current constraints concerning data collection and feasibility, which allows to continuously 
adapt the second list to changing constraints over time (Robeyns, 2003). 
Due to evident feasibility constraints that would only be overcome by conceptual rethinking, 
redirected research funding, public action and debate, most empirical applications in the first 
two literature branches of large-scale policy evaluation and poverty analysis rather seem to 
jump directly to the second step and use ad hoc lists and weights based on the available data 
without explicitly discussing the selection and weighting exercise in the form of theoretically 
grounded draft lists in the literature (as done by Robeyns, 2003 and Alkire, 2002b) or in 
public debates (as demanded by Sen (see citation above)).  
The second specification aspect regarding aggregation is conceptually cumbersome. 
Interestingly, practical implementations of multi-dimensional poverty and welfare 
measurement tend to stick to the economic tradition of calculating an aggregate measure. 
These appear in the form of, for example, reduced summary indices with arbitrarily set 
weights like the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990) and the Human Poverty Index 
(UNDP, 1997) based on data at the national level, or scientifically sound composite measures. 
The development of the latter commonly pursues the following steps of analysis (c.f. Kuklys, 
2005): i) the selection of latent functionings to be investigated depending on the purpose of 
the analysis and of observable indicators for each functioning based on the reasoning and 
judgment of the researcher, ii) the determination of numerical values for the measurement of 
the achieved functionings, iii) the estimation of a ‘functioning production function’ or   17
‘conversion function’, a specific feature of the capability approach (as described in the 
previous section) to explain the achieved level of functionings by causal determinants in 
terms of individual or external conversion factors (and income), and finally, iv) the 
aggregation of different functionings into one deprivation measure. 
One example is Klasen’s composite index measuring relative deprivation based on i) 14 
functionings each represented by only a single indicator, ii) the numerical measurement of 
each achieved functioning by intuitively set cardinal rank order scores, iii) the causal 
modeling of the conversion function by regression analysis, and iv) the aggregation of all 
functionings into a deprivation index employing statistically set weights by principal 
component analysis (Klasen, 2000). A theoretically more comprehensive approach – although 
more distant to the actual capability concept of differentiating between resources, 
functionings and capabilities – is presented by the multidimensional indices for absolute 
poverty measurement by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003). The study involves a careful 
consideration of formal postulates like subgroup decomposability and transfer principles. Its 
empirical example rests on i) only two dimensions, which are the resource income and the 
functioning education represented each by a single indicator, ii) the determination of 
numerical values in terms of classical average income per capita and years of schooling, and 
the definition of an arbitrary absolute poverty line for each of the two, iii) the lack of a 
‘functioning production function’ or ‘conversion function’, which might be seen as a draw-
back from the capability perspective because the influence of individual and external 
conversion factors on the achieved level of functionings remains befogged, and finally, iv) the 
aggregation of the two indicators into one deprivation measure while considering different 
degrees of substitutability between them and two alternative arbitrary weighting schemes.
9 
 
In order to circumvent the conceptually difficult aggregation decisions, also non-aggregated 
measures have been proposed. In a separate analysis of non-aggregated indicators of social 
functionings, Qizilbash and Clark (2005), for example, use a fuzzy poverty measure of 
continuous cut-offs based on survey data of people’s own identification of basic 
functionings.
10  
At this point, a general comment on aggregation is appropriate. Whether the economic 
tradition of using a single quantitative aggregate poverty measure is the conceptually best way 
to deal with capability deprivation (apart from being highly attractive in order to allow 
country rankings and comparisons with classical income measures) has been questioned by 
Sen himself. He argues that “[…] it is difficult to see why simplicity of use should have such   18
a priority over relevance. As it happens, the more diverse characterizations of living standard, 
with various components separately presented, can be used in many practical exercises 
without great difficulty.” (Sen, 1987b: 34). The problem related to the mentioned “simplicity 
of use” is associated with the necessary task of selecting capability indicators and their 
respective weights as a condition for aggregation. Accordingly, Alkire (2002b: 30) concludes 
“[…] that if certain functionings/ capabilities are identified as valuable, then it is evident that, 
even if there is substantial disagreement as to the relative weights of the various capabilities, 
having more of each of them would be an improvement.” The above mentioned examples of 
multidimensional poverty measures illustrate the difficulties and disaccord regarding the 
selection and weighting of functionings, not to think of doing the same for unobservable 
capabilities. 
 
All of the studies mentioned above analyze functionings.
11 Due to the fact that it is much 
more difficult to measure capabilities, even less empirical applications can be found in this 
field. Motivated by the legitimate argument that “by concentrating on functionings alone, the 
analysis might do no more than multivariate work on poverty does already and it fails to 
exploit one of the most distinctive elements of the capabilities approach” (Anand, Hunter, and 
Smith, 2005: 14-15), Paul Anand and his co-authors have undertaken the only attempts we are 
aware of to analyze potential instead of achieved outcomes, i.e. capabilities instead of 
functionings (Anand, Hunter, and Smith, 2005; Anand and van Hees, 2006). Based on 
Nussbaum’s pre-established list of basic capabilities and British survey data on self-reported 
aspects of well-being, they show to what extent the different capabilities have gender-
sensitive impacts on subjective overall satisfaction. This causal analysis underpins the first 
step of all applied capability analysis, which is the selection and combination of possible 
capability indicators. What remains open is the task to develop one aggregated or several 
single deprivation measures and possibly procedures to identify an adequate cut-off for 
empirical poverty analysis based on these interlinkages between capabilities and well-being. 
The above examples show that there is still little overall consensus on how to operationalize 
the capability approach respecting the decisions which functionings should be selected for 
welfare measurement, how they should be measured and compared, and how to empirically 
move from the achieved functionings to derive the potential functionings, i.e., the capabilities 
that represent Sen’s ultimate measure of well-being in terms of freedom to choose. Among 
the causes for this situation are the relative recentness of the field, the still limited number of 
applications, and the data constraints to analyze capability deprivation, but also the   19
disciplinary gap in terms of scientific language and techniques between the capability 
literature and classical welfare and poverty economics (Kuklys, 2005).  
Nevertheless, this review of some of the main existing applications of the capability approach 
demonstrates some general aspects of income deprivation that are interesting in view of 
operational targeting and outreach evaluation. In summary, the cited studies show that  
-  income is one factor of overall satisfaction, serves as indicator of the basic capability of 
being able to hold property and has various subjectively reported interlinkages with other 
basic capabilities (Anand, Hunter, and Smith, 2005),  
-  income and expenditure-related variables serve as appropriate input indicators for 
economic deprivation, which is one component of multidimensional poverty, but that they 
do not necessarily predict the state and outcome of overall human well-being (Wagle, 
2005), a core argument of the capability approach,  
-  income has little direct impact on certain single functioning achievements like health or 
housing when compared to the influence of individual conversion factors such as gender 
or marital status (Kuklys, 2005), and 
-  the relative poverty rankings, the identification of poor social sub-groups and the policy 
conclusions resulting from outcome-oriented capability indices (that may include income 
or expenditures as an indicator for one of several components) and pure input-type income 
measures differ considerably (Klasen, 2000; Kuklys, 2005). 
This leads us to the question of how to evaluate income versus capability measures and draw 
the respective conclusions with regard to operational poverty assessment. 
Pulling the strings together 
We have seen that the empirical consideration of the theoretical animadversion of the 
capability approach on the welfaristic market and behavioral assumptions underlying income 
would be particularly cumbersome in microeconomic poverty analysis (c.f. Kuklys and 
Robeyns, 2005). This, of course, applies equally to the development and use of targeting and 
outreach evaluation tools that rely on poverty assessments at the household level.  
The unsatisfactory assumptions have motivated economists in all times, including today’s 
capability researchers, to look for alternatives to the income measures. Sen shows that already 
Lagrange and Adam Smith found it necessary to take note of different needs for different 
nutrients (and goods and services) by different people according to their physical, mental, 
social and occupational situation. “If the perspective of functionings and capabilities has been 
neglected in the literature on real income and living standard, the reason for this cannot be   20
found in the absence of early initiatives in that direction” (Sen, 1987b: 23). Already in the 17
th 
century, Sir William Petty made attempts to include non-income indicators in his 
measurement of the living conditions of people. “But he was also realistic enough about 
measurement problems to concentrate almost exclusively in opulence when it came to 
estimation” (Sen, 1987b: 21). Some of these ‘measurement problems’ in terms of selecting 
and weighting functionings or capabilities have been illustrated in the previous section.  
 
A particularly difficult issue is the aggregation of single capability deprivations into an 
overall poverty index. For the purpose of developing and using targeting or outreach 
assessment tools, such an aggregated measure would not only require the relative weighting 
of capabilities (or functionings) to derive an overall measure of the standard of living but 
would have to be based on absolute cut-off levels of single or overall capability outcomes in 
order to allow regional or inter-project comparisons of deprivation.
12 The questions that such 
poverty tools commonly have to provide answers for are: What percentage of the program or 
project participants are capability deprived in terms of a certain (potentially fuzzy) absolute 
deprivation level? This allows to investigate whether the program reaches its outreach 
objectives to the actually deprived and to assess how it performs in comparison to other 
policies. To know that project participants are relatively more deprived than the control group 
(as made possible with Klasen’s (2000) capability index presented above and other existing 
multidimensional measures of relative poverty like the CGAP poverty assessment tool 
developed by Zeller et al. (2006)) would not be enough. (For potential uses of operational 
tools assessing relative poverty see van Bastelaer and Zeller, 2006.)  
Although the presented attempts to operationalize capability poverty are promising, they do 
not yet (and cannot without public agreement on reasonable cut-off levels) provide 
satisfactory answers for absolute capability measures at the national or regional program 
level. Therein lies one of the reasons for otherwise willing economists concerned with large-
scale monitoring and evaluation to always come back to income measures and thereby taking 
the risk that ‘simplicity gains priority over relevance,’ if income assessments are not 
accompanied with measures of at least some functioning achievements.  
 
Apart from the empirical challenges, a further stumbling block of interdisciplinary 
cooperation seems to be the dissent between traditional welfare economists and capability 
researchers concerning the question whether or to what extent the two approaches to poverty 
measurement are theoretically reconcilable. Kuklys (2005) argues that a valuation in terms of   21
wrong or right of the two concepts is difficult because “[b]oth are normative approaches and 
differ in their underlying philosophical foundations, which are subject to reasoning rather than 
statistical testing” (Kuklys, 2005: 3). Welfare economists, in contrast, tend to minimize the 
differences by saying that “[t]he idea of ‘capabilities’ does not substitute for utility (or some 
money metric of utility) as the individual welfare indicator but complements it, by introducing 
more information into assessments of poverty, information that would otherwise be hidden 
from view. Attempts to present the two approaches as fundamentally different and to debate 
their relative merits can thus be misleading” (Ravallion, 1998: 9). The confusion of poverty 
economists might be enhanced by the doubt whether the command over material resources is 
not only a means to another end but could itself be seen as a basic capability, namely that of 
being able to hold property (Anand, Hunter, and Smith, 2005), and if so, whether income 
would be an adequate indicator for it (McKinley, 2006). However, with reference to the 
importance of conversion factors for achieving functionings, which themselves are defined as 
‘beings or doings’ rather than ‘material havings,’ we cannot satisfactorily conceptualize the 
command over marketable goods as capability itself, at least not in the terminology of Sen’s 
capability approach.
13 An alternative, conceptually sound way of dealing with monetary 
measures would rather be the "‘costing’ of capabilities instead of basic food and non-food 
needs. But many capabilities are difficult to cost; and it is pointless to cost others, e.g., 
political freedom” (McKinley, 2006). This dilemma does not, however, sanction the use of 
monetary measures (that consider public goods as well) as one of the – if not the – most 
important input indicator for economic or material deprivation (Wagle, 2005).  
 
It is not our purpose here to justify or valuate either of the above positions concerning the 
reconciliation of both approaches but to elucidate why and under which definitional 
restrictions monetary welfare measures would have to be used in operational poverty 
assessment.  
What remains as alternatives after having discussed the advantages and problems of capability 
as compared to income poverty are: i) to give up the idea of outreach evaluations at the 
national level and limit capability-based analyses to small project areas where participatory 
poverty research on the selection of capabilities, local indicators and absolute cut-off levels 
can be conducted, ii) to use a multidimensional poverty assessment tool (using functional 
forms such as the Bourguignon-Chakravarty Indices) while accepting the conceptual 
challenges in terms of aggregation weights and the arbitrary value judgment concerning 
absolute cut-of levels, or iii) to virtually accept the welfaristic assumptions of monetary   22
welfare measures but conceptualize expenditure deprivation as only one ingredient to 
multidimensional capability poverty (recognizing that it does not necessarily predict the state 
and outcome of overall human well-being) and ideally complement it with non-income 
measures.  
 
For the task of implementing operational, low-cost targeting tools for absolute poverty 
assessment that are derived from survey data and can be used to adhere to and scrutinize the 
manifold political and legal commitments related to the Millennium Development Goals and 
national poverty reduction strategies, we prefer the third alternative. Coming back to 
Kakwani’s millionaire with an incurable disease, we would not identify her as ‘expenditure 
deprived’ applying the monetary poverty measure in the first step but definitely as ‘capability 
deprived’ as soon as additional non-income measures are considered. The opposite would be 
true for the long living beggar introduced by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003). Which of 
the two situations deserves to be called ‘poverty’ is up to the stakeholders’ preference. 
Kakwani (2006) implicitly suggests to only call the resource-related expenditure deprivation 
‘poverty’ in order to distinguish it from ‘capability deprivation’. We would rather avoid the 
term ‘poverty’ alone and use ‘monetary poverty’ or ‘expenditure deprivation’ to remind the 
reader and ourselves of the fact that human well-being depends on much more than income. 
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1 As an alternative and intermediate stage between using a continuous welfare functions and a clear poverty line, 
fuzzy poverty measures try to account for the fact that poverty is no discrete condition (see Qizilbash and Clark 
(2005) and the references therein). 
2 There is no room here to discuss the alternatives and consequences with respect to the choice of consumer price 
indices, calculation of purchasing power parities, or consideration of household size and composition by means 
of equivalence scales. For details and remaining problems refer to Cutler, 1984; Deaton, 2001; Ravallion, 1998; 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2006; Sabates, Gould, and Villarreal, 2001; Son and Kakwani, 2006; Székely et al., 
2000. 
3 Greer and Thorbecke (1986) show for Kenya that an empirically derived cost-of-calories function might be 
more precise in capturing actual consumer preferences and prices than a normative cost-of-basic-(food)-needs 
approach.   26
                                                                                                                                                          
4 Other prominent authors of related capability concepts, particularly Martha Nussbaum, and researchers that 
further developed Sen’s approach like David A. Clark can only be mentioned at this place due to the limited 
scope of the present study and their partly different (legal, political, or macroeconomic) focus. Others will be 
referred to in the section on the operationalization of the capability concept. For a recent bibliography see 
Robeyns (2006a) and the references in Kuklys (2005). 
5 Due to the philosophical jargon typical for the literature of the capability approach, it has received relatively 
little recognition in applied and theoretical welfare economics. For a comprehensive effort to translate the multi-
dimensional capability concept into formal economic language and techniques, see Kuklys and Robeyns (2005).  
6 More specifically, Sen’s theoretical criticism regarding welfare economics centers around the utilitarian 
concept of defining overall welfare as the sum of maximized individual utilities, the associated proscription of 
interpersonal comparisons based on the conviction that pleasure or desire-fulfillment have no common 
denominator across individuals, and the Pareto criterion of optimality. The discussion takes place in the context 
of Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ and Rawls’s ‘difference principle’. For details refer to Sen (1979b) and Sen 
(1996). 
7 For a detailed definition of ‘capabilities’ or ‘freedoms’ as the fundamental higher ends, under which certain 
‘valuable activities and states of being‘ or ‘functionings’ of a person can be achieved, refer to Sen (1985). 
8 Sabina Alkire presents an insightful comparison of such lists of essential dimensions of well-being proposed by 
Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, Manfred Max-Neef, Deepa Narayan et al., and others and finds basic agreement 
between the latter three with respect to the following dimensions of human development: material well-being, 
physical well-being (health), security or protection, social well-being (affection/ friendship/ relationships), 
understanding or knowledge, psychological well-being (identity, happiness, peace of mind), participation, leisure 
or play, creation or work, religion or transcendence, and freedom of choice and action (Alkire, 2002a; Alkire, 
2002b). 
9 As far as inequality is concerned, a methodologically sound approach employing structural equation modeling 
is applied by Kuklys (2005: chapter 3 and 4). It is based on i) two separately analyzed functionings represented 
each by various indicators, ii) the numerical measurement of each functioning made up of a formal model 
(confirmatory factor analysis) of the respective indicators, iii) the causal modeling of the conversion function by 
a structural model, and iv) the aggregation of functionings into a weighted composite index in the form of a 
axiomatically sound multidimensional measure of inequality, not poverty. 
10 A further example of non-aggregated measurement of multidimensional well-being is the approach employed 
by Wagle (2005), which is conceptually not satisfactorily comparable to the terms and procedures of Sen’s 
capability. Nevertheless, the study achieves to quantify the causal relationships between five unobservable, latent 
‘dimensions’ of well-being and details the first step of capability analysis, namely, how to identify relevant 
indicators for each dimension using an estimation procedure based on structural equation modeling as well. 
11 Note that Klasen (2000) and Qizilbash and Clark (2005) state to analyze basic ‘capabilities’ while referring to 
achieved outcomes of certain dimensions of well-being. In line with the terminology used so far in this paper, we 
identify achieved, observable outcomes (after making a choice between available alternatives) as ‘functionings’ 
and potential options as ‘capabilities’ (c.f. Alkire, 2002b; Kuklys, 2005; Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). 
12 Qizilbash and Clark (2005) discuss the empirical implications of the fact that Sen conceptualized deprivation 
at the level of resources (like income) as relative, at the level of outcomes of well-being (in terms of capabilities 
or functionings), however, as indeed absolute. 
13 Note that in addition to Sen’s capability and functionings concept of ‘beings and doings,’ Max-Neef Elizalde, 
and Hopenhayn (1989: 32-33) include a further component of ‘havings’ (such as, e.g., having teachers) although 
not to be understood in a strictly material sense. 